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Abstract- Active, non-intrusive inspection or interrogation technologies have been used for over 100 years - with
the primary focus being radiographic imaging. During the last 50 years, various active interrogation systems have
been investigated and most have revealed many unique and interesting capabilities and advantages that have
already benefited the general public.  Unfortunately, except for medical and specific industrial applications, these
unique capabilities have not been widely adopted, largely due to the complexity of the technology, the overconfident
reliance on passive detection systems to handle most challenges, and the unrealistic public concerns regarding
radiation safety issues for a given active inspection deployment. The unique homeland security challenges facing
the United States today are inviting more “out-of-the-box” solutions and are demanding the effective technological
solutions that only active interrogation systems can provide.  While revolutionary new solutions are always desired,
these technology advancements are rare, and when found, usually take a long time to fully understand and
implement for a given application. What’s becoming more evident is that focusing on under-developed, but well-
understood, active inspection technologies can provide many of the needed “out-of-the-box” solutions.  This paper
presents a brief historical overview of active interrogation.  It identifies some of the major homeland defense
challenges being confronted and the commercial and research technologies presently available and being pursued.
Finally, the paper addresses the role of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and its 
partner, the Idaho Accelerator Center at Idaho State University, in promoting and developing active inspection 
technologies for homeland defense.
*Supported in part by the DOE Office of Nonproliferation Research and Engineering under Contract Number DE-
AC07-99ID13727.
I. INTRODUCTION 
Active, non-intrusive interrogation technologies
are inspection systems that take advantage of an 
externally applied “source” to perform traditional
imaging of, or to stimulate characteristic emissions
from, an inspected object.  While this broad
definition covers a large range of inspection systems,
this paper will focus only on ionizing radiation-based
inspection systems using photons and/or neutrons for
emission and/or attenuation measurements of the
inspected object.  These types of inspection systems
are selected primarily due to their inherently high
penetration capability of the source radiation with
shielded configurations. While not intended to be
all-inclusive, this paper will present representative
systems that are being considered for homeland
defense applications.
Despite today’s public belief that active
interrogation technologies are relatively new
approaches being considered to address today’s
challenging homeland defense needs, active 
technologies have been in use for over 100 years.
Röntgen1 pioneered the first practical x-ray
inspection application in 1895 as he was testing his
cathode-ray tube prior to carrying out his first
experiment. This single discovery marked the
beginning of the atomic physics era and of many of
today’s contemporary medical applications with
electrons and photons.
Jones, J.L.,  “Active, Non-intrusive Inspection Technologies for Homeland Defense,” Sixth International Meeting on Nuclear Applications of 
Accelerator Technology (AccApp’03), San Diego, CA, June 2003, pp. 33-41.
In the early 20th century, x-ray-based imaging
continued to be rapidly developed, considerable
research was being performed to understand electron,
photon, and neutron interactions with matter2, and 
interests in higher energy interactions were
beginning. By the mid-20th century accelerator-
based radiation sources were being developed,
medical imaging was well accepted, and most
common interactions with matter were well 
understood.  During the last 50 years, considerable
technological improvements have been made. With
the advent of computers we are now predicting
coupled photon-neutron interaction in materials,3 are
developing prototype and/or commercial systems for 
infield radiography and computed tomgography
imaging,4,5 are using higher energy systems for 
medical oncology applications,6 are developing
transportable systems for research and application
use,7 and are beginning to appreciate the technology
implications and benefits of even higher accelerator
energies.8
After the September 11, 2001 terrorism events,
officials have realized the consequences of this
continued escalation and are now recognizing,
accepting, and supporting the development of active
inspection systems that allow significantly greater
container content characterization within an 
approved radiation safety envelope.
Today homeland security demands our national
and focused attention.9,10  Specifically, the defense of 
our county mandates the efficient and successful
detection of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
consisting of nuclear,9 explosive,10 and/or biological
components within various shielded configurations
and in various environments.  These shielding
configurations range from the simple package in a
mailroom to the very complex 40-to-50-foot long,
cargo containers passing through ports.  The latter is
receiving the most attention since there are over 301
port of entries in the US and over 16 million
containers are brought into these ports annually.11
Active interrogation technologies are presently
addressing the detection of the nuclear and explosive
components. The detection of shielded biological
agents with a radiation-based active interrogation
technique is still challenging at this time.
During the last several decades, government
officials have acutely recognized the continued
escalation of terrorism around the world (see Table 
1); however, most were complacent in their 
perceived satisfaction of the existing level of 
homeland security and the fact that any significant
event would not (could not) occur within the United
States. II.  SOURCES AND EMISSIONS
Active inspection systems require an 
interrogating source of radiation and a means of
detecting the characteristic object emissions.  The
radiation source emissions can be continuous or
pulsed.  This section will focus on sources and
emissions applicable to homeland security.
Table 1.  Major Terrorism Events.
Event Year Location Explosive
PanAm
103
1988 Lockerbie,
Scotland
Semtex
WTC
Bombing
1993 New York, NY Ammonium
Nitrate-
based
Murrah
Federal
Building
1995 Oklahoma, OK Ammonium
Nitrate-
based
Khobar
Towers
1996 Saudia Arabia C4
Embassy
Bombings
1998 Nairobi, Kenja
& Dar es
Salaam,
Tanzania
TNT
WTC,
Pentagon
2001 NY, NY;
Wash., D.C.
Airliner & 
fuel
Numerous photon sources are available.  Photon
sources include both gamma-ray (from atomic
nucleus) and x-ray (from atomic structure) sources.
Gamma-ray sources are radioactive sources such as
Cs-137 (0.66 MeV) and Co-60 (1.17 and 1.33 MeV).
X-ray (i.e., bremsstrahlung) sources provide a broad
spectrum photon emissions from the interaction of
energetic electrons with atomic electrons. The
maximum energy of a bremsstrahlung spectrum
corresponds to the maximum electron beam energy. 
Figure 1 presents representative bremsstrahlung
spectra, for a given electron-photon converter, as a 
function of various electron beam energies.
Radioactive neutron sources include spontaneous
fission sources (e.g., Pu-239, Cf-252 with energies
up to 10 MeV with a most probable neutron energy
of ~1.2 MeV) or alpha-n sources such as PuBe or
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AmBe sources that provide significantly higher 
neutron energy emissions.  Numerous reactions can
also be used to generate a neutron source.  Some of 
these reactions and their corresponding neutron
yields are shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
Figure 3.  Photoneutron yields of infinitely thick
metals as a function of electron energy.13
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Figure 1. Bremsstrahlung radiation spectra.
In general (d,n) reactions are the most prolific
neutron producers (see Figure 4) with both the (p,n)
and (J,n) reactions following closely behind.   In 
particular, the (J,n) reactions can produce very high
neutron fluence rates via high-power electron beams
with neutron energies approaching the impinging
electron beam energy less the threshold energy of the
photonuclear process.
Figure 4.  Neutron yield curves as a function of
bombarding deuterium energy.14
Figure 2. Neutron yield curve as a function of
bombarding ion energy.12 Active interrogation applications for homeland
defense involve the detection of characteristic
photons and neutrons.  For imaging applications,
transmission and backscatter photons have been used
by companies such as Science Applications 
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International Corporation, Inc. (SAIC), Advanced
Research and Applications CORporation, Inc.
(ARACOR), American Science and Engineering,
Inc. (AS&E) and Varian Associates, Inc.  These
image detection systems are particularly sensitive to 
higher-Z, high-density objects.  For lower-Z objects,
neutron imaging continues to be considered. While
direct neutron imaging with acceptable resolution is
challenging, some interesting progress continues
with thermal15 and fast16 neutron imaging.
Generally, the most specific information is 
obtained with elemental characteristic gamma-ray
detection.  In this spectral method, the interrogating
neutrons interact with the object material(s) (via
inelastic scattering or thermal neutron absorption) to 
emit gamma rays characteristic of the elements
composing the material(s). The detection of these
gamma rays is accomplished with one or more
application-matched detectors.  Representative
detectors include sodium iodide (NaI), high purity
germanium (HPGe), bismuth germanate (BGO), or
cadmium-zinc-telluride (CdZnTe).  When inelastic
scattering is utilized, the detection method is
typically referred to as a “fast neutron” analysis.
When thermal neutron interactions are utilized, the
analysis technique is called a Thermal Neutron 
Activation (TNA) analysis.  For photon
interrogation, the corresponding spectroscopic
analysis is typically referred to as a Photonuclear
Activation (PA) method.
III. IMAGING 
Imaging is the most common and widely utilized
active, non-intrusive inspection method. While the
familiar medical/dental and handbag-type
radiographic imaging uses less than 500 keV
photons, homeland defense applications require both
adequate image resolution and good inspected object
penetration.  This dual requirement drives the need
for higher photon beam energies with performance-
matched imaging detectors.  Two of theses higher
energy systems include the SAIC VACISTM and the
ARACOR EagleTM systems.
The VACISTM system5 uses a gamma-ray source
consisting of an ~1 Ci Cs-137 or Co-60 radioisotope,
a steel and tungsten source housing, a tungsten slot 
shutter, and a motorized actuator for shutter rotation.
Opposite to the source is a proprietary imaging
detector assembly.  The object to be imaged is 
positioned between the source and detector
assembly. Currently, SAIC has developed six
versions of the VACIS design to address various
needs. Many of these systems are already in daily
use worldwide.  Figure 5 shows a mobile
deployment.
Figure 5.  Mobile VACISTM. (Courtesy of SAIC)
The ARACOR Eagle,TM shown in Figure 6, is a 
mobile, cargo inspection unit providing real-time,
radiographic imaging of larger inspected items, such
as a cargo container at a port  The cargo image is
acquired and displayed as the unit “drives over” the
cargo container or other inspected item.  The
inspection system uses a nominal 6-MeV electron 
accelerator with a proprietary imaging assembly.
Using a proprietary accelerator shield configuration,
the Eagle operates within operational safe radiation
exposure limits to its operators, the container, and 
any container stowaways.  The inspection unit is 
designed to have a rapid port-to-port relocation
capability.  An EagleTM unit is operational at the
Port-of-Miami and additional units are being
procured by U.S. Customs for other ports.
Figure 6. The ARACOR Eagle.TM (Courtesy of
ARACOR)
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IV. EXPLOSIVE DETECTION 
As has been identified in Table 1, explosives
appear to be the weapon-of-choice for many
terrorists. While the detection of explosives (pound
quantity) has been, and continues to be, the focus of
the Transportation Security Agency relative to
handbags, luggage and personnel, another
challenging detection is being investigated by the
Department of Defense (DoD) for vehicles entering
facilities, such as military bases.  The DoD’s 
Physical Security Equipment Action Group
(PSEAG) has identified10 the need for detecting large
quantities of concealed explosives in a car or truck
from a stand-off distance of several meters.   This
group believes that neutron-based technologies
should be able to meet this objective within 18 
months.  Four explosive detection technologies are
presented below.
The Pulsed Elemental Analysis with Neutrons
(PELAN) system17, shown in Figure 7, is a mobile,
SAIC-patented, explosive and illicit drug detection
system developed at Western Kentucky University
between 1998-2001.  PELAN uses as a pulsed, 14-
MeV neutron generator with a combined pulsed
fast/thermal neutron activation method to detect and
measure characteristic gamma rays from the major
and minor chemical elements in an object.  PELAN
uses BGO or gadolinium orthosilicate (GSO)
gamma-ray detectors.   Explosives and illicit drugs
are identified primarily from ratios of chemical
elements such as H, C, N, and O, the major elemental
constituents of them.
Figure 7.  The PELANTM System. (Courtesy of
SAIC)
The ANCORE Vehicle Explosive Detection
system (VEDS) is a TNA technology capable of
detecting explosives in cars and trucks.  Two VEDS
configurations are available: a portal and a mobile
version. Figure 8 shows the portal VEDS system.  In
the portal system the VEDS is rail-mounted and
moves relative to a stationary inspected vehicle.  In 
the mobile version, VEDS is mounted on a vehicle
and driven along side the inspected vehicle.  The
nominal system uses a Cf-252 neutron source and an
array of co-located NaI detectors.   A modified
design is being developed which replaces the
radioactive source with a neutron generator.
Figure 8.  The portal VEDS system.
The ANCORE Cargo Inspector (ACI), shown in
Figure 9 uses the Pulsed Fast Neutron Activation
(PFNA) technology.18 The system can detect 
explosives, narcotics, alcoholic beverages, chemical
agents, etc.  The principles of the PFNA method are
presented in Figure 10.  PFNA uses a directed,
pulsed beam of high-energy neutrons that interact in
Figure 9. ANCORE ACI system.
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The interrogating neutrons induce element
characteristic gamma rays from the interrogated
object. The PPA system was successfully 
demonstrated to the PESAG on October 2002 and
clearly showed at least a 3-m explosive detection of 
explosives located within the trunk of a vehicle.20
The Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy
(PINS) system21 is a TNA-type, nondestructive tool
designed to identify the contents of munitions and
chemical storage containers.  The nominal PINS
system, shown in Figure 12, uses a Cf-252 source
and a HPGe detector.  The system was designed and
built at the INEEL, has been commercialized, and
has had considerable utilization with the U.S. Army.
A neutron generator version of the PINS has also
been developed. The PINS system, like the PPA
system, has also been shown to effectively detect 
explosives concealed in cars.20
Figure 10.  Principles of PFNA operation. (Courtesy
of ANCORE). 
the nuclei of elements in scanned objects.  The 
directed neutron beam is rastered over the scanned
object during the inspection.  The element-
characteristic gamma rays are detected and analyzed.
Inspections are safe to the user, to the cargo, and to 
stowaways.
The Pulsed Photoneutorn Activation (PPA) system19
shown schematically in Figure 11, is a TNA-based
system using a pulsed, high-energy (up to 12-MeV)
electron accelerator and a custom-built HPGe 
gamma-ray spectroscopy system designed especially
to operate within intense pulsed photon
environments. This system was designed and built by
the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory (INEEL). Each electron pulse produces
highly penetrating bremsstrahlung photons that can
also be used to provide radiographic imaging. The
interrogating source neutrons are generated by the
bremsstrahlung photons interacting in a photoneutron
source material co-located with the photon source.
Figure 12. The INEEL PINS system.
V. NUCLEAR MATERIAL
DETECTION
Before the September 11, 2001 terrorist events,
most nuclear material detection efforts within the US
focused on material safeguards and waste 
management issues.22 Over the past decade nearly
400 international cases of purported nuclear
smuggling has been complied by the International
Atomic Energy Agency.11 Within the US, safeguard
applications focused primarily on inventory control
and the ability to detect relatively small amounts of
diverted material on personnel via portal monitors at
entry and exit choke points.  For waste management
applications, 55-gallon drums and crate-like
configurations were of interest. Similar to cargo 
container inspections, the waste management
applications required nuclear material detection
Figure 11. Schematic of the INEEL PPA system.
Jones, J.L.,  “Active, Non-intrusive Inspection Technologies for Homeland Defense,” Sixth International Meeting on Nuclear Applications of 
Accelerator Technology (AccApp’03), San Diego, CA, June 2003, pp. 33-41.
within a broad range of non-nuclear material
contents.
To address the waste management applications,
systems like the Los Alamos National Laboratory’s
(LANL) Crate Waste Assay Monitor (CWAM),23
shown in Figure 13, have been developed. These
systems consist of a neutron generator and a large-
solid angle configuration of neutron detectors
(typically composed of helium-3 gas) around the
inspected object.  Pulsed neutrons interrogate the
object and induce subsequent fissions in the nuclear 
material.  By time correlating the neutron emissions
with each interrogation pulse, the detection response
can identify differences that directly indicate 
information about the nuclear material within the
contents.  This inspection method is also applied to 
smaller packages.
Figure 14. ARACOR EagleTM with PPAT Detection
System.
VI. INEEL’s ROLE 
From the early waste management applications to
today’s homeland security needs, the INEEL has
been and continues to be a nuclear science leader in 
non-intrusive, active interrogation technology
development.  INEEL’s strong partnership with the
Idaho Accelerator Center (IAC) (see Figure 15) at 
the Idaho State University, has effectively merged
academic strength with national laboratory capability
to provide a nationally recognized, very flexible
environment for performing research, development,
and testing of active systems.Figure 13.  Crate Waste Assay Monitor (CWAM)
(Courtesy of LANL)
Another representative detection system
indicating an ability to detect nuclear devices within
cargo containers is the ANCORE’s PFNA
technology.24  This technology was presented in
Section IV.
The final technology being developed to address
nuclear material detection within cargo containers is 
the INEEL Pulsed Photoneutron Assessment
Technology (PPAT)25,26.  This technology uses high
penetration capability of energetic photons (up to 
12 MeV) from a pulsed, linear electron accelerator to
induce fissions in nuclear materials.  The resulting
delayed neutron emissions are measured between
each accelerator pulse to detect the nuclear material
contents, and variations in the electron beam energy 
can allow nuclear material identification. As shown 
in Figure 14, efforts are currently underway to 
incorporate the PPAT detection system with the
ARACOR EagleTM design to support combined
radiation-safe, nuclear material detection with real-
time radiographic container imaging.
Figure 15. The Idaho Accelerator Center.
Today’s INEEL’s active interrogation thrust
involves the fundamental research and development
of non-intrusive, standoff, cargo container
inspections. Current research is directed toward the
detection of nuclear smuggling, especially very-
difficult-to-detect Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU),
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To achieve these research and development
objectives, the INEEL and its research partners will 
develop and demonstrate advanced capabilities and
techniques that provide for robust “cabinet-safe”
(i.e., radiation safe) designs with
optimized/customized interrogation system detection
and imaging components.  These systems will
provide greater resolution and fidelity for car, truck,
and cargo container characterization and 
identification with reduced overall inspection times.
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